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Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Subcommittee on Health Chair Brett Guthrie (R-KY), and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA), on behalf of the Health and Oversight Subcommittee Republicans, today wrote letters to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and U.S. Department of Agriculture. The letters come as part of the Committee’s ongoing investigation into federal laboratory biosafety practices, and the handling of dangerous pathogens in bioresearch.  KEY EXCERPT :  “Committee is investigating the safety and security of federal high-containment laboratories. We are writing to obtain further details about the performance and enforcement of the federal select agent program (FSAP), jointly managed by the CDC/Center for Preparedness and Response/Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)/Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)/Veterinary Services/Agriculture Select Agent Services.”  BACKGROUND :  At an April 27, 2023, oversight hearing titled “Biosafety and Risky Research: Examining if Science is Outpacing Policy and Safety,” Members and witnesses discussed the FSAP and how to strengthen the oversight of safety in life sciences labs.  According to the seven published FSAP Annual Reports from 2015 – 2021:  The FSAP conducted 1,316 inspections: 173 by the Agriculture Select Agent Services, 857 by the Division of Select Agents and Toxins, and 286 joint inspections by CDC’s DSAT and USDA’s APHIS  The FSAP conducted 46 compliance inspections  17 entities participated in the FSAP Corrective Action Plan program  The FSAP made 20 referrals to the HHS OIG and/or the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Investigative and Enforcement Services  The Chairs requested documents and answers to questions, including the following, by September 29, 2023:  Please provide copies of all referrals the FSAP has made to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General and/or APHIS Investigative and Enforcement Services since January 1, 2015. Please provide the outcomes of these referrals.  According to the 2020 Annual Report, FSAP received one report involving a complaint about transportation issues that were unrelated to the SAR. FSAP referred this complaint to the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Transportation. Please provide a copy of this referral. Please provide the outcome of this referral.  Please provide copies of all FSAP compliance inspections conducted at laboratories at FDA, NIH, and CDC since January 1, 2015.  Since January 1, 2015, please list all entities levied civil money penalties as a result of FSAP enforcement actions, the nature of the violations, the kinds of pathogens involved, amount of the penalties, and the total amount of civil money penalties collected. Did any federal government entity have SAR violations that would have subjected a non-federal entity to civil money penalties? If so, which ones, and why were civil money penalties not levied?  For 2015-2021, the FSAP reported conducting 1,316 inspections. How many of those inspections were unannounced inspections?  Since December 22, 2022, has there been a release, loss, or theft of an agent or toxin listed as a federal select agent from or within a laboratory facility owned or operated by the HHS, or any other Federal laboratory facility?     If so, was there a notification to this committee or the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of the Senate no later than 72 hours after such event was reported to the HHS Secretary, including (1) the Federal laboratory facility in which such release, loss, or theft occurred; (2) the circumstances of such release, loss, or theft? If not, why not?  Not later than 14 days after such notification to the committees, was an update provided to the committees on (1) any actions taken or planned by the HHS Secretary to mitigate any potential threat such release, loss, or theft may pose to public health and safety; and (2) any actions taken or planned by the HHS Secretary to review the circumstances of such release, loss, or theft, and prevent similar events. CLICK HERE to read the full letter.

Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Subcommittee on Health Chair Brett Guthrie (R-KY), and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA), on behalf of the Health and Oversight Subcommittee Republicans, today requested the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct a study on the National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) effectiveness in overseeing grant funding. BACKGROUND :  NIH is one of the top research and development funding agencies—particularly for biomedical research.    NIH’s program level funding for Fiscal Year 2023 as enacted is $47.678 billion.   In fiscal year 2020, the agency obligated nearly $43 billion for research in areas such as infectious disease prevention, cancer treatment, and mental health.   NIH obligated as much as 80 percent of these funds towards extramural research, performed by outside organizations including universities, medical centers, and other research institutions.   Organizations receiving extramural research awards from NIH may, in turn, award sub-grants for a portion of the work.   As highlighted in HHS OIG and GAO reports , the use of sub-grants may further complicate the management and oversight of NIH research funds.  KEY EXCERPTS :  “A January 2023 report by the Office of Inspector General within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS OIG) detailed failures by NIH to monitor effectively its grants with EcoHealth Alliance, a nonprofit research organization. According to that report, the organization had overcharged the government for its services and improperly used federal grant funds. Further, a July 2023 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) raised similar concerns about NIH’s oversight of grant recipients and recommended that NIH make improvements to its oversight processes.”  […]  “In light of the recent problems in NIH’s oversight and the scale of NIH’s funding of extramural research awards, more transparency is needed about NIH’s policies and procedures as well as its effectiveness in overseeing financial management of its extramural research awards.” The Chairs requested answers to the following questions:  How much funding did NIH provide—using grants, cooperative agreements, or other award mechanisms—for extramural research since fiscal year 2014? For the same time frame, what resources did NIH and each of its institutes and centers have to conduct financial management oversight?  What are the trends in award funding including, for example, the research areas and types/characteristics of award recipients funded; the number, size, and duration of awards; the types of award mechanisms used?  What policies, procedures, and processes does NIH follow to administer and oversee its extramural research awards using grants, cooperative agreements, or other award mechanisms? How do policies, procedures, and processes differ among the NIH institutes and centers in administering and overseeing extramural research awards?   To what extent is NIH, consistent with its policies and procedures, ensuring effective financial management oversight of extramural research funding throughout the award life cycle?  What are the roles and responsibilities of those involved in such oversight including the award recipient?    How, if at all, does NIH’s oversight of extramural research funding differ for intramural research funding?  What internal assessments, if any, does NIH conduct to provide reasonable assurance that funds are being used as intended—including that proposed rates and costs are reasonable and funds are being used appropriately?  How much money has NIH recovered as a result of such internal assessments?    What changes, if any, has NIH implemented based on the findings and lessons learned from such assessments?  What data does NIH collect on the findings and results of its internal assessments? Are there data gaps, and can these gaps be addressed?   What are the lessons learned or best practices from institutes and centers that could be implemented across NIH? CLICK HERE to read the full letter.

Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Chairman Morgan Griffith (R-VA), and Subcommittee on Health Chairman Brett Guthrie (R-KY), along with Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic Chairman Brad Wenstrup (R-OH) and Committee on Oversight Accountability Chairman James Comer (R-KY), wrote to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in an effort to force officials to comply with previous requests for COVID-19 origins information and cease stonewalling.  In a letter to HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra, the Chairs renewed requests from four previous letters for potentially incriminating documents and communications concerning EcoHealth Alliance, Wuhan Institute of Virology, and the now infamous “Proximal Origin” publication. The Committees have also asked individuals potentially involved with a COVID-19 origins cover-up to appear voluntarily for transcribed interviews—most notably Dr. Francis Collins, Dr. Lawrence Tabak, and Dr. Hugh Auchincloss. If HHS does not meet the stated deadlines, the Chairs will be forced to consider the use of subpoenas to obtain the requested COVID-19 origins information. “This letter consolidates our previous requests regarding the origins of COVID-19 and, as a further accommodation to the Department, tables some requests, adds significant topic specificity, scopes down the time frame of our previous requests, and prioritizes requests most important to the Committees. Considering these significant accommodations, we expect full and timely compliance with each request,”  wrote the Chairs . “If the Department fails to meet any of the prescribed deadlines, the Committees will be forced to consider the use of the compulsory process.” In a second wave of letters, the Chairs reiterated invitations to three individuals with extensive involvement in COVID-19 origins related operations to appear for voluntary transcribed interviews. Notably, the renewed request for the testimony of Dr. Peter Daszak, President of EcoHealth Alliance, is critical to the investigation into the potential use of American taxpayer funds to conduct dangerous gain-of-function research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.  Further, the Chairs requested voluntary transcribed interviews with Mr. Greg Folkers—who served as Dr. Anthony Fauci’s Chief of Staff—and with Mr. F. Gray Handley—who served as Associate Director for International Affairs at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Should Dr. Daszak, Mr. Folkers, and Mr. Handley continue to refuse to cooperate with the Committees, the use of subpoenas will be considered. Read the letter to HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra here.  Read the voluntary transcribed interview requests for Dr. Peter Daszak, Mr. Greg Folkers, and Mr. Gary Handley below:  Dr. Peter Daszak , EcoHealth Alliance President   Mr. Greg Folkers , Former Chief of Staff at NIAID  Mr. Gary Handley , Former Associate Director for International Affairs at NIAID 

E&C Republicans Demand an Extension of EPA’s Comment Period for Proposed PFOA and PFOS CERCLA Designation    Washington D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA) and Environment, Manufacturing, and Critical Materials Subcommittee Chair Bill Johnson (R-OH) sent a letter to the EPA urging the agency to reopen its comment period on a proposed new rule that designates all Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid (PFOS) as hazardous substances. Given the unprecedented nature of the rule, as well as the concerns raised during EPA’s initial comment period, the members requested the agency reopen the comment period for an additional 60 days. BACKGROUND:  On September 6, 2022, EPA proposed a new rule that would designate PFOA and PFOS as “hazardous substances” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ( CERCLA ).   The EPA has never—in the more than 40 years since its enactment—used its CERCLA authority in this way.  Furthermore, the rule was proposed without thoroughly reviewing the indirect costs and economic implications for designating all PFOA and PFOS chemicals as hazardous, which is why the Office of Management and Budget reversed EPA’s view that this proposal was not “economically significant.”  A hazardous substance designation for PFOS and PFOA would have permanent, far-reaching implications for manufacturers, consumers, municipalities, and disposal companies, and could jeopardize products and services that Americans rely on every day—including smartphones and home appliances, to life-saving medical devices, airplanes, and more.  PFOA and PFOS cleanup is urgently needed, but this rule raises legitimate and significant implementation and environmental questions that must be addressed.  KEY EXCERPTS:  “We urge you to give the American public a more robust opportunity to provide meaningful input.”  […]  “The public’s voices should be heard now rather than later in a hearing room or court room. We encourage EPA to reopen the public docket and extend the comment period for, at a minimum, an additional 60 days, to subject this proposal to a complete airing under the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act, ensure an objective and transparent accounting and weighing of the costs and benefits of this proposal, and to reconsider and eliminate its potential negative public policy outcomes, especially those that are reasonably foreseeable.”  CLICK HERE to read the full letter.  CLICK HERE to read about Republican pushback to extreme PFAS legislation in July 2021.  CLICK HERE to read about past CERCLA proposals targeting PFAS. 

Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Republicans, led by Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers, wrote to Ford President and CEO James Farley regarding a new partnership with Chinese-owned Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (CATL) to build lithium iron phosphate batteries in the United States.  CLICK HERE to read FOX News's coverage: BACKGROUND :  Earlier this year, Ford announced it would invest $3.5 billion to construct a lithium iron phosphate battery plant in Marshall, Michigan.  According to Ford, its wholly-owned subsidiary will manufacture the battery cells using Chinese company CATL’s technology and services.  KEY LETTER EXCERPTS :  “While Ford has labeled this project a ‘commitment to American manufacturing’ and asserts it will create 2,500 new American jobs, we are concerned that Ford’s partnership with a Chinese company could aid China’s efforts to expand its control over United States electric vehicle supply chains and jeopardize national security by furthering dependence on China.”  […]  “Additionally, Members learned at this hearing that Chinese companies often supply their own workers to projects in Latin America and Africa, reinforcing fears that CATL will import workers for this facility rather that creating jobs for United States workers.”  […]  “We seek to learn more about whether this partnership, and others like it, will potentially exacerbate our reliance on China. Should China gain control of domestic electric vehicle production, the United States would be exposed to serious national security risks at a time of escalating geopolitical tensions.”  The Members requested information and answers to the following questions by September 18, 2023:  A copy of the complete licensing agreement between Ford and CATL, including any appendices, amendments, or addenda.  All documents and communications exchanged between Ford officers or employees and officials, appointees, employees, contractors, or consultants of the United States government referring or relating to Ford and CATL’s partnership and eligibility for tax credits and federal incentives.  Did Ford consider making a similar investment in a partnership with a non-Chinese company? If so, why did Ford ultimately decide to partner with CATL? If not, why did Ford not consider other partners?  How many CATL employees will CATL supply to the Facility?  What steps did Ford take to prevent or limit CATL’s ability to halt production unilaterally, such as at the direction of the Chinese government?  CLICK HERE to read the letter. 

Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Energy, Climate, and Grid Security Subcommittee Chair Jeff Duncan (R-SC), and Environment, Manufacturing, and Critical Materials Subcommittee Chair Bill Johnson (R-OH) sent letters to the Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding their progress implementing National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) reforms included in the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA). BACKGROUND:   FRA, which was signed into law by President Biden on June 3, 2023, included a provision directing DOE, EPA, NRC, and FERC to implement changes to NEPA.  In order to boost energy production and lower energy prices for Americans, it is critical that these agencies implement these changes, which lift regulatory burdens for the construction of more energy infrastructure.  The years-long, complicated reviews involved with NEPA and resulting litigation have sidelined many energy infrastructure projects across the U.S.  The provisions in the FRA would streamline NEPA and improve review times and the overall regulatory efficiency. The purpose of the letter is to ensure that these agencies are following the intent of Congress and adhering to the coordination requirements and deadlines set forth by the FRA. KEY EXCERPT FROM THE LETTER TO ENERGY SECRETARY GRANHOLM: "Section 321 of the FRA includes provisions from H.R. 1577, the BUILDER Act, which also passed the House of Representatives as part of H.R. 1, the Lower Energy Costs Act. The section in the FRA streamlines NEPA and improves federal review times by designating one lead agency, limiting evaluation to a single environmental document, setting page limits on environmental impact statements (EIS) and environmental assessments (EA), establishing deadlines of two years for EISs and one year for EAs, allowing for categorical exclusions, and instituting the E-NEPA unified permitting portal, among other provisions. Depending on the project, DOE could be considered a lead agency or a cooperating agency, both of which would have a key role in the implementation of the corresponding NEPA reforms." Members asked Secretary Granholm to respond to the following questions regarding the FRA NEPA changes by September 18, 2023:  What is DOE’s interpretation of Section 321 of the FRA?    How long will it take DOE to implement fully Section 321 of the FRA?   What changes are being made to DOE’s existing NEPA review processes to ensure that the Agency is following the updated law?    Are you confident that DOE will meet the two-year and one-year statutory deadlines for EIS and EA reviews, respectively?    Will you commit to adhering to the page limits for EIS and EA reviews set forth in the Fiscal Responsibility Act?    Will DOE apply the NEPA changes to projects and reviews that are already in process, or does the Agency plan to apply the NEPA changes just prospectively?  CLICK HERE to read the full letter to DOE. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to EPA. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to NRC. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to FERC.

Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Energy, Climate, and Grid Security Subcommittee Chair Jeff Duncan (R-SC), and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA) sent a letter to Hawaiian Electric seeking information regarding the role of electric infrastructure in the August fires that broke out on the island of Maui and in the town of Lahaina. Letters were also sent to the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission and the Hawai’i State Energy Office. KEY EXCERPT: “Our hearts are with the people of Maui as they confront immense grief, sadness, and despair, especially for those who are still searching for their missing loved ones. The pain is unimaginable and the road to recovery is long. We must come to a complete understanding of how this disaster started to ensure Hawaii and other states are prepared to prevent and stop other deadly wildfires.” […] “In our capacity as Chairs of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the U.S. House of Representatives and its respective energy policy and oversight subcommittees, we are empowered to oversee energy supply, reliability of all power, and regulation of energy resources throughout the country. To that end, we seek a fuller understanding of the role, if any, of the electric infrastructure in this tragic event.” BACKGROUND: On Tuesday, August 8, 2023, a series of deadly fires broke out on the island of Maui and in the town of Lahaina, resulting in the tragic loss of many lives and the destruction of entire communities. The fires are the deadliest in modern U.S. history, with the current death toll at over 100 lives and many hundreds more still missing. Reported evidence of a downed power line sparking dry grass in Lahaina indicates that Hawaiian Electric equipment may have contributed to the fires. Information is also coming to light about actions taken – or not taken – by Hawaiian Electric to harden and modernize the electric grid of Maui in response to the growing risk of wildfires in recent years. Chairs Rodgers, Duncan, and Griffith asked Hawaiian Electric to respond to the following requests for information: What is your understanding of the sequence of events and actions on August 8, 2023, involving the Lahaina fire, including actions taken by Hawaiian Electric? Please describe all actions taken by Hawaiian Electric to address fire risks to the electric grid on Maui prior to August 8, 2023 (going back through 2013). Please describe all actions taken by Hawaiian Electric, Hawaii Public Utilities Commission, Hawai’i State Energy Office and any other applicable entities to mitigate invasive grasses and other vegetation on the island of Maui, in order to prevent or minimize fire risks. Please provide Hawaiian Electric spending on Maui for the past ten years, including, but not limited to, specific spending for utility infrastructure, for energy generation, to meet Hawaii’s renewable energy mandates, and to address identified fire risks. What Hawaiian Electric actions regarding fire risks to the Maui electric grid are pending before the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission? What is the status of those actions? Has the Hawai’i State Energy Office been involved in grid modernization, hardening, and resilience efforts by Hawaiian Electric? If yes, please describe those efforts. In July 2021, the Maui county government assessed and issued a report on the growing threat of fire to the island. Did the report involve any recommendations regarding the electric grid? If yes, what is the status of implementing those recommendations? What orders has the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission issued, or actions taken, since 2018, to address fire risks to the electric grid on Maui? What actions did Hawaiian Electric take after the Maui fires on August 8, 2023, relating to the removal of any equipment, including but not limited to, damaged power lines and poles? Did Hawaiian Electric, Hawaii Public Utilities Commission, and/or the Hawai’i State Energy Office receive any funds from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021 or the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022? If so, please provide the amount of money, the program under which the funding was awarded, and the type of funding (grant, loan, etc.). CLICK HERE to read the full letter.

Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Full Committee Ranking Member Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ), Innovation, Data, and Commerce Subcommittee Chair Gus Bilirakis (R-FL), and Subcommittee Ranking Member Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) wrote to Meta and other online marketplaces today requesting information regarding efforts to end the sale of banned and recalled hazardous products on their platforms. KEY EXCERPTS FROM THE LETTER TO META: “The U. S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is tasked with keeping the public safe from consumer products that pose an unreasonable risk of injury or death. In addition to its own work, the CPSC relies on online marketplaces, like Meta, to keep consumers safe by preventing the posting for sale of products that are known to be dangerous. It is our understanding that Meta has been falling short on this mission.” […] “Meta’s failure to prevent recalled products from being posted for sale on its platform has resulted in your users and their children being placed at risk of purchasing and using a product that CPSC has found to pose a serious risk of injury and potential death.” BACKGROUND: The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) relies on online marketplaces to keep people safe by proactively preventing the sale of products that are known to be dangerous.  Recent reports suggest that at least one platform, Meta, has fallen short of that responsibility, despite numerous takedown requests from CPSC. CPSC has issued takedown requests to various platforms, including several takedown requests for recalled products related to infant deaths. CPSC has formally issued an approximately one thousand take down requests a month for these products. To date, the volume of takedown requests has not slowed, and CPSC staff is unaware of any proactive measures by the platform in question  to prevent these postings in the future. This lapse has resulted in thousands of users and their children being put at risk of using a product that has been found to pose serious risk of injury and potential death. The Chairs and Ranking members asked companies to provide answers to the following questions by August 31, 2023: What systems do you have in place to ensure recalled products that the CPSC has determined pose a serious risk of injury and potential death are not able to be posted to your marketplace? Do you have a compliance staff dedicated to consumer product safety issues? If so, how many full and or part time staff are on that team? What actions do you take to monitor CPSC recalls? What actions will you take to ensure that the Fisher Price Rock ‘n Play, Boppy Newborn Lounger, and similarly designed and/or other recalled products are not available on your platform moving forward? Are there statutory issues that are creating a gray area where it is unclear what the platform’s responsibilities are? Will you commit to working with the Committee to find a solution to this, to ensure that CPSC’s resources are not wasted on sending thousands of takedown requests for products that pose a known hazard and are for sale on your marketplace? CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Meta. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Amazon. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Walmart. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Target. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Bikelist. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Ebay. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Etsy. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Goldin. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Kidizen. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Mercari. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to OfferUp. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Poshmark. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Reverb. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to TikTok. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Pinduoduo. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Alibaba. CLICK HERE to read the full letter to Shein.

Agency Received Nearly $9 Billion in COVID Supplemental and 9-8-8 Hotline Funds   Washington D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Health Subcommittee Chair Brett Guthrie (R-KY), and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA), on behalf of the Health and Oversight Subcommittee Republicans, sent a letter to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) requesting a full accounting of how the agency spent more than $8 billion that it was allocated in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The letter is a continuation of the Committee’s investigation into the COVID supplemental funds received by SAMHSA and awarded to states. Previous responses from SAMHSA did not detail how much of these funds have been spent and how these expenditures were used. KEY EXCERPTS: “Unfortunately, even after prompting by the Committee staff, SAMHSA is not providing the full accounting for billions of dollars in expenditures as requested. SAMHSA needs to be fully forthcoming with information about nearly $8 billion in COVID supplemental funds received by SAMHSA and awarded to states. “In addition, SAMHSA reported more than $900 million has been “invested” in the 9-8-8 crisis care system since FY 2022. This is a massive amount of money, and SAMHSA has not produced specific data showing how these funds are being used, or even if they are being used. “SAMHSA’s description of the December 2022 cybersecurity incident impacting the 9-8-8 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline is also troubling. SAMHSA reported that it is still awaiting the final report from its third-party security assessor.” “Further, SAMHSA suggested that the Committee direct detailed questions to the FBI, given the ongoing nature of the investigation. Given that this incident is being investigated by law enforcement, this indicates a much more significant and concerning event.” CLICK HERE to read the full letter. CLICK HERE to read the Committee’s April 2023 letter to SAMHSA.